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Abstract
This paper addresses the determinants of diﬀusion of broadband in-
frastructure by looking at the U.S. Federal States. It tries to iden-
tify in particular to what extent intra- and inter-platform competition
contribute to accelerating the speed of diﬀusion. Panel data analysis
results indicate that both types of competition signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
rate of diﬀusion, although with diﬀerent eﬀect. Intra-platform com-
petition seems to have a positive impact only initially on the rate of
diﬀusion but then dissipates. For the longer term, inter-platform has
a much more important role in driving the rate of diﬀusion. The study
takes account of the impact of other variables measuring competition
in the telecommunications sector as well.
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The diﬀusion of access to broadband services is high on the political agenda
of developed countries because of the positive externalities involved with the
adoption of such technology.1 The political debate rotates about what are
the policies most conducive to achieve fast and rapid diﬀusion of broadband
access infrastructure.2 Broadband access can be provided via diﬀerent tech-
nological platforms or types of networks. An important feature therefore is
the role of legacy telecommunications systems in place and to which extent
market power with the legacy system can be transferred also to the emerg-
ing broadband market. Regulatory reform in the telecommunications sector
was aimed at introducing competition during the last decade or so. Whereas
this was fairly successful for certain technologies, such as mobile telecom-
munications where market concentration has been reduced substantially, it
was much less so for the ﬁxed, or wireline, network. An international com-
parison in the wireline access markets shows that for most OECD countries
the market share of the incumbent wireline ﬁrm is well above 90 per cent.
As wireline access is key in providing broadband services, policy makers
have to ﬁnd ways in with this market power problem. There are generally
two policy issues at stake: ﬁrst, the objective of rapid diﬀusion of broad-
band access; second, the issue of economic conditions of service provision.
Although the two issues are interrelated, for the sake of simplicity let us as-
sume them as separate for the moment. In the political discourse, diﬀusion
is getting the main attention, as countries are typically benchmarked by this
parameter. The argumentation generally is that competition drives diﬀu-
1There is for instance the Recommendation of the OECD of 12 February 2004.
2For a summary of the policy options see Umino (2002).
2sion (ITU, 2003). Competition can be enhanced in two ways: ﬁrst, through
service competition on the same network facility trough open access pro-
visions; second, through facility based competition by means of alternative
local access modes. The former will be referred to as intra-platform compe-
tition and the latter as inter-platform competition. Substantial regulatory
eﬀort during the last decade has been devoted towards creating the condi-
tions for equal access, in particular though the unbundling of infrastructure
elements for local access. This turned out as being a particularly challenging
task for regulators as they had to trade oﬀ the interests of new entrants for
low access prices with the interests of the incumbent in terms of long-term
incentives for infrastructure investments. The success of unbundling mea-
sures as device for reducing incumbent’s market power turned out as being
mixed so far, with regulators in countries such as the U.S. basically giving
up on the objective.3 As a result the option for inducing facility based com-
petition seems to be the less controversial one from a regulatory point of
view, provided that market are capable of accommodating alternative in-
frastructures (Faulhaber and Hagendorn, 2000). This paper addresses the
determinants of diﬀusion of broadband infrastructure by looking at the U.S.
Federal States. It tries to identify in particular to what extent intra- and
inter-platform competition contribute to accelerating the speed of diﬀusion.
The diﬀusion of broadband access in the U.S. has been subject to a number
of empirical studies. Aron and Burnstein (2003) have found evidence that
facility based competition drives diﬀusion using cross section data of the U.S.
Federal states. Wallsten (2005) looked into the eﬀectiveness of regulatory
3This is generally the interpretation given by observers for the FCC not appealing to
Court’s ruling against unbundling measures imposed on incumbent local exchange carriers
(see also Nuechterlein and Weiser, 2005).
3and policy variables, including subsidies, to aﬀect diﬀusion of broadband
access. He ﬁnds that all measures, apart from access to rights of way, are
not signiﬁcant.4 A major novelty of this study is the use of a panel data set
for the U.S. Federal States over the period 1999 − 2004, which provides the
opportunity to achieve robust statistical results. The study is arranged as
follows. Section 2 presents some background information to understand the
broadband market and its institutional settings. Section 3 illustrates the
diﬀusion model that serves for the econometric study. Section 4 presents
and discusses the results and tests their robustness. Section 5 concludes.
2 The broadband market
The most common networks to provide broadband access are traditional
telecommunications access networks using copper pair cable in the local loop
and the cable TV networks using diﬀerent versions of coaxial cables. In the
U.S., as in many other countries, these infrastructures have been built long
time ago and hence signiﬁcant upgrade investments are required to achieve
broadband transmission capability in the local access network. In the case
of telecommunications infrastructure this is achieved by the switch to digi-
tal subscriber line (DSL) technology,5 whereas with cable TV infrastructure
it requires investments that allow also for reverse ﬂow of traﬃc.6 There
are also other technological platforms that can provide access to broadband
4One major limitation pointed out also by the author is that the policy variables have
no time dimension, i.e. they are assumed constant throughout the sample period.
5DSL requires investment into the so-called central oﬃce which allows to increase the
transmission capacity and splits the traﬃc into voice and data.
6Originally the cable TV infrastructure was designed for unidirectional traﬃc only,
sending TV signals from the emitter to the customer.
4services such as wireless services (either by satellite or by ground based in-
frastructure, known also as wireless in the local loop) or via the powerline.
These platforms have however found only limited application and hence the
debate is concentrating on DSL and cable TV. Both systems happen to
be subject to some form of regulation in most countries as they are based
on infrastructures with natural monopoly features. However, as the type
of service provided with each system is diﬀerent (i.e. voice telecommuni-
cations services or TV services respectively), they are typically subject to
diﬀerent regulatory regimes.7 In the US, the evolution of the telecommu-
nications market is oriented by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. That
act crystallised the policy objective of overturning the regulated monopoly
regime by injecting competition in the market, and these forces should in
the long term make regulation unnecessary. There are three components in
this strategy; ﬁrst, eliminate local telecommunications monopoly franchises
by allowing entry also by others (e.g. locally franchised cable TV operators);
second, by interconnection mandate, meaning that new networks would be
able to interconnect; third, incumbent operators were mandated to unbun-
dled network elements, such as local loop access to customers. The driving
idea of the latter was that new entrants would attempt to get wholesale ac-
cess to incumbent’s customers to “taste the water” and successively possibly
invest in own infrastructure. This is the “stepping stone” theory to facil-
ity based competition. However, empirical evidence seems to suggest that
7The main distinction made is between communications services an information ser-
vices. Communications services are typically regulated, while information services are not.
Telecommunications services fall under communications services. TV services are informa-
tion services, but the cable TV companies are prevented from oﬀering telecommunications
services jointly.
5exactly the opposite is happening. For instance, Hazlett (2005) ﬁnds that
unbundling measures have actually reduced the new entrants’ investment
in infrastructure. The terms for wholesale access were posed in such a way
that they took out the incentives to invest in competitive infrastructure.
The unbundling obligation was ultimately successfully challenged in court
in 2004. As the regulator FCC did not react to this, this was widely seen as
a strategy switch away from service competition on a single infrastructure
towards facility based competition. Also cable TV networks, the main al-
ternative network for broadband service provision, is subject to regulation
in the U.S.. Whereas regulation in cable TV was mainly aimed at consumer
protection from unjustiﬁed pricing policies by cable operators and in pro-
viding content (Crandall and Furchtgott-Roth, 1996), cable operators are
not regulated in the sale of cable modem service. Diﬀerently from an in-
cumbent local exchange carriers for telecommunications, cable operators are
under no obligation to oﬀer competitors the use of infrastructure for broad-
band services on a wholesale basis in order that the competitor could oﬀer
competing broadband services on a retail basis. There have been several
calls for abandoning these asymmetric regulatory measures in broadband
infrastructure provision. For instance, Crandall et al. (2002) argue that
telecommunications should be deregulated in the provision of DSL services
as they found that demand for DSL services is price-elastic and DSL ser-
vice providers do not have market power. To summarise, this asymmetric
regulation becomes problematic once ﬁrms coming from diﬀerent industries
historically providing diﬀerent service, now oﬀer the same broadband ser-
vices. For instance, there is a debate in the U.S. on whether cable TV ﬁrms
should be allowed to provide also voice telephony (Crandall et al. 2002), a
market from which they generally are excluded. Likewise, local telecommu-
6nications companies are compelled in most countries to “unbundled” local
access loops, i.e. to share or entirely provide a subscriber line to other ﬁrms
at cost based prices, whereas cable TV ﬁrms do not have such obligations.
Legacy regulatory measures therefore are expected to have a strong bear-
ing on the diﬀusion of broadband access, and an intense political discussion
is ongoing on how these regulatory measures should be updated to take
the technological developments into account (Hausman et al. 2001). There
seems to be a consensus on the claim that competition is a major driving
force for the diﬀusion of broadband access. Competition may occur at dif-
ferent levels. For instance, it may concern diﬀerent technological platforms
or networks, or it may occur on the same network when the owner of the
infrastructure is obliged to unbundled network elements for other ﬁrms to
provide services on the same platform. Any of the two forms of competition
may have some drawbacks. Competition among platforms may lead to inef-
ﬁcient duplication of network infrastructure, or in some cases to absence of
infrastructure in certain areas where demand level is not suﬃciently high.
Likewise, facing competition on the same platform may lead to insuﬃcient
incentives for infrastructure investment by the network owner.8 Formulat-
ing optimum policies therefore remains a delicate balancing of the diﬀerent
elements. Whereas in the U.S., after the repeal of the instances brought for-
ward by the defenders of unbundling measures, there is now a trend towards
8The eﬀects of availability and competition on the adoption of broadband services
may be ambiguous. Consider, as an example, two countries: in one country half to the
residents have broadband access via DSL only and the other half via cable TV only. In the
other country, half of the residents have access to broadband services via both platforms,
whereas the other does not have any access to broadband at all. A priori it is not clear
which state would end up with a higher level of penetration (Aron and Burnstein, 2003).
7greater emphasis of inter-platform competition in broadband diﬀusion, in
other countries such as the E.U. unbundling is still considered as one of the
cornerstones of driving broadband diﬀusion. This may be also because of
more limited scope for inter-platform competition as in several E.U. coun-
tries cable TV network are not present or are not capable of delivering
broadband services (see European Commission, 2004).9
3 The model
This study is an empirical investigation into the diﬀusion of access to broad-
band services in the U.S.. The data is collected at the level of Federal State
and allows for a panel analysis.10 The data is semi-annual with the pe-
riod of observation running form June 1999 to June 2004. The evolution of
broadband subscribers is based on a logistic model of technology diﬀusion.11
Let yit denote the number of agents that have adopted the new technology
in state i at time t; let y∗
it denote the total number of potential adopters.
The fraction of the total number of potential adopters in state i that have






1 + exp(−ait − bitt)
(1)
The variable ait in equation (1) is a location or “timing” variable. It shifts
the diﬀusion function forwards or backwards, without aﬀecting the shape of
9On the arguments against mandatory unbundling see Criterion Economics (2003).
10All the series related to the telecommunication industry are from various reports
issued by the Federal Communications Commission (http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/
stats.html). The macroeconomic data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi).
11See Geroski (2000) for a recent overview of the literature on technology diﬀusion.
8the function otherwise. For example, when ait is very high, we may say that
state i at time t is very “advanced” in its adoption rate. The variable bit is
a measure of the diﬀusion growth. This can be veriﬁed from diﬀerentiating










This implies that bit equals the growth rate in the number of adopters at
time t, relative to the fraction of adopters that have not yet adopted at time
t. Equivalently, this says that the number of new adopters at time t, relative
to the fraction of adopters that have not yet adopted at time t, is a linear
function of the total number of consumers that have already adopted at time
t. This reﬂects the epidemic character of the logistic diﬀusion model. It can
be veriﬁed that the second derivative of (1) is positive for yit/y∗
it < 1/2, and
negative if the reverse holds. The diﬀusion of the number adopters thus
follows an S-shaped pattern, with a maximum diﬀusion speed reached when
half of the total number of potential adopters has eﬀectively adopted the








≡ zit = ait + bitt (2)
The dependent variable, zit, is the logarithm of total number of adopters
relative to the number of potential adopters that have not yet adopted.
We now specify the three essential determinants for the diﬀusion of mobile
telecommunication services: the total number of potential adopters, y∗
it; the
location variable, ait; and the growth variable bit. As typically done in
diﬀusion studies of this kind (Dekimpe, Parker and Sarvary, 1998; Gruber
and Verboven, 2001a) the parameter y∗
it may be given, considering also that
estimation would be problematic, since most states are still at the early
9stages of diﬀusion. Gruber and Verboven (2001a) resolved this problem by
pooling the data, and estimating a parameter, common for all countries.
This facilitates estimation because one can exploit information from both
countries in early and in more mature stages of diﬀusion. This approach
was also justiﬁed in their study as they considered a relatively homogeneous
group of E.U. countries. Second, this assumption makes the model linear
and thus very much improves the scope for the estimation of the remaining
parameters. The location variable ait and the growth variable bit in (2) are
speciﬁed in a general form as:
ait = α0
i + xitα (3)
bit = β0
i + xitβ (4)
The parameters α0
i and β0
i are state-speciﬁc location and growth eﬀects. The
vector xit includes continuous variables aﬀecting the location or growth vari-
ables. The dependent variable, the number of broadband subscribers may
be normalised in diﬀerent ways; by relating them to the total population
in the state, the number of households, or by the number of ﬁxed telecom-
munications lines in the state. In line with common practice, our preferred
measure of broadband penetration is the ratio of the number of broadband
subscribers and population in the state.12 In any case, the choice of any
of all these measures has no signiﬁcant impact on the qualitative statistical
results. The independent variables are as follows:
Concentration index of inter-platform competition :
HHinter =
Pm
i=1(Bi/TB)2, with Bi being the number of broadband
12The main reason being that the number of households neglects the relevance of broad-
band for business and the number of telecommunications lines does not take into account
the diﬀusion of cable TV.
10lines of platform i (DSL, Cable) and TB the total of broadband lines.
It is the sum of the squared market shares of each platform, that is a
sort of Herﬁndahl index computed over the technology shares (rather
than ﬁrms’ shares). This index has the range of 1
m < HHinter ≤ 1,
where m is the total number of diﬀerent platforms in the market. The
higher the value the more the market is tilted toward a single platform.
Concentration index of intra-platform competition :
HHintraj = 1/nj, with nj being the number of ﬁrms (providers) for
platform j. It is the standard Herﬁndahl index in the symmetric case.
This has the range of 0 < HHintraj ≤ 1. The higher the value the
higher the market power of ﬁrms in that platform market (the more
concentrated that market).
Degree of Competition in Telecommunications :
it is indicated by the number of lines served by the competitive lo-
cal exchange carries over the total number of ﬁxed lines within the
state. The higher this value, the higher the competition degree of the
telecommunications network.
Telecommunication Density :
for DSL technology to be viable the length of the local loop, which
is the distance between the subscriber and the so-called central oﬃce
should not be too large, normally within the range of a few kilometers.
Thus the more central oﬃces a state has, the more it is amenable to
supplying broadband access. This density may be indicated by the
ratio between the number of lines and the number of central oﬃces.
The higher this number, the lower the density of broadband access in-
11frastructure. It is expected that density should have a positive impact
on diﬀusion.
Potential for Broadband Competition on TLC Lines :
it is the share of central oﬃces (CO) upgraded for equal access (EA)
on total CO indicates the potential for broadband competition on
telecommunications lines.
Table (1) presents some descriptive statistics on the broadband penetration
rate and the included explanatory variables. The overall statistics are com-
puted on the whole sample (50 units - the U.S. Federal States - over the ten
semesters13). The other two lines instead report the between and the within
components of the overall variation of each variable. The former computes
the deviations of the individual means (computed over time) from the gen-
eral mean (it measures the variation across units). Then it uses n number of
observations (the U.S. Federal States here). The latter represents the devi-
ations from the individual means (the variation within units). All variables
of our model show quite high coeﬃcients of variation both cross-section and
across periods conﬁrming the relevance of our analysis.
13The panel is unbalanced. Unbalanced panels may arise because of sample selection.
A speciﬁc source of sample selection in panel surveys is attrition, that is, the fact that
some of the units originally included in the panel may be lost through time. However,
given the type and the sources of our dataset, here attrition may reasonably be considered
as a typical case of random missing. That is, it is unrelated to the response variable.
Therefore it does not bias the information carried by the sample.
124 Results and discussion
The econometric analysis has been conducted specifying three diﬀerent mod-
els. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation, which we refer to as the basic one, includes only
our intra- and inter-concentration indexes, both as location and as diﬀusion
factors, and a variable capturing the growth in the general economic con-
ditions of the states. The other two models allow for a richer framework
where the other measures of the evolution of the competition degree in the
telecommunications sector are accounted for.
For each speciﬁcation, the Random Eﬀects (RE) and the Fixed Eﬀects
(FE) estimators have been used and tested. Table (2) contains the results.
They indicate that inter-platform competition (HH inter) has a strong im-
pact on diﬀusion, whatever the speciﬁcation adopted. The signs of the
parameter estimates however need some qualiﬁcations. Stronger platform
competition has an important negative inﬂuence on the location parameter,
but the impact on the diﬀusion speed is positive. This suggests that, in
states with inter-platform competition, the initial availability of broadband
is low, but in the longer term this competition eﬀect improves and overtakes
the availability eﬀect. In other words, to reach outer areas, infrastructure
competition is conducive in driving penetration. A totally diﬀerent picture
seems to emerge from the parameter estimates for intra-platform compe-
tition. Concerning competition on cable TV platforms (HH intra-cable),
the results suggest that initially competition has a positive impact, but this
fades away over time. This result may be due to the fact that there are typ-
ically non-overlapping cable franchises and cable operators are not required
to unbundled network elements. For the wireline telecommunications (DSL)
platforms (HH intra-dsl), the signs for the parameter estimates are similar.
13The sign of the location parameter is positive and negative on the speed
parameter. This suggests that competition on the platform would have a
positive impact on diﬀusion only temporarily, but not in the longer run.
To complete this picture the other two speciﬁcations consider other vari-
ables aﬀecting the wireline infrastructure. For instance the impact of the
market share owned by competitive local exchange carriers (Tlc Competi-
tion Degree in Model 1) is highly positive on location but then it lowers
the diﬀusion over time. Similarly, the share of central oﬃces converted to
equal access (Potential for BB Competition in Model 2) and the density of
broadband access infrastructure (Tlc density in Model 2) do not seem to
spur broadband adoption. This suggests that infrastructure provision for
intra-platform competition may reduce the speed of diﬀusion. Finally the
time trend is always positive regardless the speciﬁcation. This captures the
accelerating eﬀect due to the general macroeconomic conditions.
The signs and signiﬁcance of the estimated parameters remain fairly
constant across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations estimated. However, the Haus-
man test for the hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the two estimators
always rejects the null. Since the FE estimator is consistent when the unob-
served eﬀects and the covariates are correlated whereas RE is inconsistent,
a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence is interpreted as evidence against the
appropriateness of the RE estimator.
Robustness of results
In this section some tests are carried out to check the robustness of the
results to potential problems which might bias our estimates. Given the
outcome of the Hausman test and the signiﬁcance of all coeﬃcients, our
preferred speciﬁcation is the FE estimator of Model 2.
14Strict exogeneity of the covariates and the full-rank condition ensure the
consistency and the asymptotic normality of the FE estimator. Assuming
for the moment that these two conditions are satisﬁed (we address the endo-
geneity issue later), correct inference requires that the idiosyncratic errors
have a constant variance across time and individuals and are serially uncor-
related. As to serial correlation we regress the ﬁxed eﬀects residuals on their
lagged value. We cannot accept the null of non-signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient
then the error term of our model displays strong serial dependence. In such
a case, the usual FE standard errors can be very misleading. Suspect on the
accuracy of our inference arises also because of the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity. So concludes in fact the test we carried out which is based on the
assumption that under homoskedasticity the squared ﬁxed eﬀects residuals
is uncorrelated with any function of the regressors.
Our proposed solution for the serial dependence and the non-uniform
variance in the idiosyncratic errors is twofold. First, we run a fully robust
variance matrix estimator. Such an estimator is valid in the presence of any
heteroskedasticity or serial dependence in the errors provided that T, the
number of periods is small relative to n, the number of individuals (the U.S.
Federal States in our case). Second, rather than compute a robust variance
matrix for the FE estimator we allow for a more general conditional vari-
ance matrix. Yet given the dimension of our dataset, using an unrestricted
conditional variance matrix might lead to poor ﬁnite-sample performance
of the FEGLS estimator. Then we employ a restricted form of the ma-
trix. Precisely we assume that the error term has diﬀerent cross-section
variances and it follows a stable ﬁrst-order autoregressive process. First two
columns of table (3) report the results of these two robust estimates. Both
models show only slight diﬀerences in the signs and sizes of the estimated
15coeﬃcients relative to the unrobust FE estimator. This means that cross-
sectional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation have not seriously biased
previous ﬁgures. Moreover the estimated coeﬃcients with the FEGLS (sec-
ond column of table 3) are always very signiﬁcant. This is expected since
the GLS estimator produces much lower standard errors than those of the
robust-variance estimator since it uses more information.
There is concern about the potential simultaneity of the computed in-
ter- and intra-platform competition indexes. Simultaneity would arise were
these explanatory variables determined simultaneously along with the in-
dependent. In such a case, there would exist correlation between the error
term and the simultaneous covariates and our FE estimates would be incon-
sistent. A general approach to estimate a panel data model when the strict
exogeneity assumption fails is to use a transformation to remove the unob-
served individual eﬀects and then search for instruments for the endogenous
regressors. A drawback with the FE transformation is that one should have
strictly exogenous instruments. Using a FD transformation instead allows
to remove the unobserved individual eﬀects and lagged levels (two periods
back) of the endogenous covariates can be exploited as instruments. We
apply this technique to our model and the results are reported in the third
column of table (3). We note that the absolute magnitudes of the estimated
coeﬃcients are always higher relative to the previous estimators. This is the
prove that the simultaneity bias does produce some distortion in our previ-
ous results. Remarkably our considerations about the role of the intra- and
inter-platform competition on the location and the speed of the broadband
adoption process are strengthened in the light of the last results.
Finally, we want to test a dynamic speciﬁcation of our model. This
implies to include a lag of the dependent variable among the regressors.
16Were the associated coeﬃcient signiﬁcant the adoption process would exhibit
state dependence. That is, the current state of the broadband diﬀusion
would depend on last period’s state. This is reasonable when one considers
the positive indirect externalities which may arise as the adoption process
evolves. The more people decide to use a broadband line, the more goods
and services compatible with that technology are developed. Therefore these
network eﬀects do impact signiﬁcantly the adoption process enhancing the
expected beneﬁt of new consumers from broadband lines due to the wider
availability of complementary services.
The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side
of our model causes endogeneity and prevents us from using the estima-
tion methods available for static models. Rather than applying an exactly
identiﬁed estimator we want to follow the procedure proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991). They suggest using the entire set of lagged values of the
dependent and of the other endogenous covariates (the Herﬁndahl indexes
in our case) as instruments in a GMM procedure. This allows to exploit
the maximum information available in each period in order to improve the
eﬃciency of the estimator. As shown in table (4) the coeﬃcient associated
to the installed base (a proxy of the network eﬀects) is positive and highly
signiﬁcant. Moreover it is important to note that the inclusion of this new
variable does not alter the main message of our story. Finally the lines at
the bottom of the table report two diﬀerent tests. The former, the Sargan
test, does not reject the over-identiﬁcation hypothesis conﬁrming the valid-
ity of our instruments. The latter, the AR(1) and the AR(2) Arellano-Bond
tests, states the presence of a ﬁrst-order serial correlation (expected since
now we are working with ﬁrst-diﬀerenced errors) but the absence of any
serial dependence of higher order.
175 Conclusion
This paper has investigated into the determinants of diﬀusion of broadband
access, which is considered of prime importance for sustained long-term
productivity growth. Particular emphasis was placed on disentangling the
eﬀect of intra-platform and inter-platform competition. The econometric re-
sults provide robust support for the hypothesis that inter-platform is more
conducive for driving diﬀusion than intra-platform competition. This may
interpreted as follows: to drive diﬀusion to the maximum you should ideally
need strong inter-platform competition and not to be worried about com-
petition on the platform. This result also has regulatory implications which
may be seen in the present context of the current regulatory debate in the
US. The FCC is about to reorient its policy priorities reducing the regula-
tory eﬀort toward equal access conditions to networks incumbent wireline
ﬁrms and in favour of investment incentives that promote inter-platform
competition. The results of this paper are consistent with such a policy
switch. The future agenda of work is to investigate whether these results
are conﬁrmed also on a cross-country basis.
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20Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Observations
BB penetration overall .0499 .0356 .001 .172 N = 484
between .0166 .0199 .0909 n = 50
within .0317 −.0255 .1311 T-bar = 9.68
HHinter-platform overall .4781 .0801 .3369 1 N = 248
between .1077 .3616 1 n = 39
within .0342 .3942 .5876 T-bar = 6.36
HHintra-dsl overall .1355 .0623 .0333 .25 N = 356
between .0493 .0573 .25 n = 48
within .0426 .0563 .2886 T-bar = 7.42
HHintra-cable overall .1661 .0562 .0526 .25 N = 268
between .0471 .1062 .25 n = 39
within .0375 .0911 .2885 T-bar = 6.87
TLC Comp. Degree overall .1076 .0598 0 .3227 N = 377
between .0438 0 .2257 n = 47
within .0443 −.0322 .2347 T-bar = 8.02
TLC Density overall 9506.4 5966.7 958.08 44701.67 N = 377
between 6016.2 978.2 26128 n = 47
within 1235.6 4473.5 28080.1 T-bar = 8.02
Pot. for BB Comp. overall .4425 .5972 .0445 4.1667 N = 510
between .5959 .0534 2.7679 n = 51
within .0887 .0504 2.225 T = 10
21Table 2: Static Panel - FE and RE estimators
(in parentheses: z/t statistics for coeﬃcients and p values for tests)
Basic Model 1 Model 2
FE RE FE RE FE RE
Location Variables
HH inter 2.69∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 1.95∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗
(8.17) (7.73) (5.57) (5.31) (4.22) (3.46)
HH intra-dsl −3.29∗∗∗ −3.28∗∗∗ −1.74∗∗∗ −1.74∗∗∗ −2.63∗∗∗ −1.99∗∗∗
(−6.95) (−6.64) (−3.17) (−3.02) (−4.84) (−3.14)
HH intra-cable −2.39∗∗∗ −2.31∗∗∗ −2.47∗∗∗ −2.37∗∗∗ −1.99∗∗∗ −2.32∗∗∗
(−4.43) (−4.11) (−4.75) (−4.35) (−4.05) (−3.93)
Tlc competition degree 2.80∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 2.23∗∗∗ 3.46∗∗∗
(3.62) (4.43) (3.06) (4.18)
Diﬀusion Variables
HH inter −0.37∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.07
(−6.65) (−5.48) (−3.24) (−2.54) (−2.54) (−0.95)
HH intra-dsl 0.30∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.07 0.09 0.35∗∗∗ 0.14
(3.92) (4.00) (0.82) (1.01) (3.71) (1.28)
HH intra-cable 0.25∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(3.29) (2.66) (3.61) (2.85) (3.72) (2.77)
Tlc competition degree −0.42∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗
(−5.17) (−5.10) (−5.19) (−4.95)
Tlc density −1.99−06∗∗∗ 1.46−06∗∗
(−2.74) (2.26)
Potential for BB comp. −0.13∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(−4.46) (−2.61)
Time Trend 0.30∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(10.99) (9.80) (11.10) (9.95) (11.14) (7.44)
Constant −4.74∗∗∗ −4.77∗∗∗ −4.87∗∗∗ −4.95∗∗∗ −4.70∗∗∗ −4.67∗∗∗
(−27.79) (−25.74) (−28.84) (−26.92) (−25.31) (−22.32)
R2 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
F-test / Wald 777.20 4937.02 659.20 5311.71 622.51 4636.56
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hausman Test 38.25 37.40 1303.36
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
∗∗∗ statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level
∗∗ statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level
22Table 3: Static Panel - Robust FE, FEGLS and FDIV estimators
(in parentheses: z/t statistics for coeﬃcients and p values for tests)
Robust Variance Fixed Eﬀects FD Instrumental
Matrix Estimator GLS Estimator Variable Estimator
Location Variables
HH inter 1.53∗∗∗ 1.39∗∗∗ 2.75∗∗∗
(2.84) (8.23) (3.22)
HH intra-dsl −2.63∗∗∗ −2.79∗∗∗ −3.60∗∗
(−3.41) (−10.38) (−2.35)
HH intra-cable −1.99∗∗ −1.88∗∗∗ −2.20∗
(−2.36) (−8.08) (−1.67)
Tlc competition degree 2.23∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗
(2.64) (5.01) (2.34)
Diﬀusion Variables
HH inter −0.16∗ −0.16∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗∗
(−1.93) (−5.43) (−2.85)
HH intra-dsl 0.35∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗
(2.52) (8.29) (2.15)
HH intra-cable 0.26∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.25
(2.26) (7.61) (1.49)
Tlc competition degree −0.39∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.28∗∗
(−4.20) (−8.07) (−2.18)
Tlc density −1.99−06 −1.98−06∗∗∗ −2.38−06∗∗
(−1.46) (−4.27) (−2.28)
Potential for BB comp. −0.13∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.11∗
(−2.86) (−7.88) (−1.84)
Time Trend 0.31∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(8.58) (22.14) (7.11)
Constant −4.71∗∗∗ −4.57∗∗∗ − − −
(−19.65) (−53.51) (− − −)
∗∗∗ statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level
∗∗ statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level
∗ statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level
23Table 4: Dynamic Panel - Arellano-Bond estimator
(in parentheses: z statistics for coeﬃcients and p values for tests)
Arellano - Bond





























Arellano-Bond test AR(1) −4.66
(0.00)
Arellano-Bond test AR(2) 1.66
(0.09)
∗∗∗ statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level
∗∗ statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level
∗ statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level
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